ABSTRACT Over the last few years, identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) has attracted widespread attention because it avoids the high overheads associated with public key certificate management. However, an unsolved but critical issue about IBC is how to revoke a misbehaving user. There are some revocable identitybased encryption schemes that have been proposed recently, but little work on the revocation problem of identity-based signature has been undertaken so far. One approach for revocation in identity-based settings is to update users' private keys periodically, which is usually done by the key generation center (KGC). But with this approach, the load on the KGC will increase quickly when the number of users increases. In this paper, we propose an efficient revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) scheme in which the revocation functionality is outsourced to a cloud revocation server (CRS). In our proposed approach, most of the computations needed during key-updates are offloaded to the CRS. We describe the new framework and the security model for the RIBS scheme with CRS and we prove that the proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen messages and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Furthermore, we monstrate that our scheme outperforms previous IBS schemes in terms of lower computation and communication costs. Identity-based signature, revocation, cloud computing, outsourcing. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature is a critical feature of public key cryptography that provides user identification, authentication and nonrepudiation. In traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), users' public keys used to verify signatures are bound with their certificates. Certificate authorities (CAs) are responsible for issuing, maintaining and revoking certificates. In identitybased cryptosystems, however, a user's identity information is the public key. It is a challenge to verify if a user has been revoked or not. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [1] suggested that the key generator center (KGC) updates secret keys for all non-revoked users periodically. The idea was adopted by many identity-based encryption schemes to realize revocation functionality. Unfortunately, there are two drawbacks with their proposals. First, the KGC must kept online, which brings out some security threats. Second, the overhead at the KGC will dramatically increase as the number of users increases.
With the rapid development of cloud computing, many organizations tend to outsource computation tasks to some powerful cloud based server. In fact, it is not rare in the history of cryptography to outsource heavy computation tasks to a third party. Quite recently Li et al. [2] introduced an approach to outsource the key-updating tasks to a Key Update Cloud Server Provider (KU-CSP) and proposed an efficient revocable identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. We adopt their approach and apply it to identity-based signature (IBS) settings. A trivial idea is to offload all key-updating tasks to the cloud server. However, there are some security issues we must take into account: the cloud server is not always trusted. So we split the signing key of a user into an initial identity key and a time update key. The former is a long-term key bound to the user's identity and issued by the KGC, and the latter is a short-term key related not only to the user's identity, but also to the current time period. The time update key is issued and updated by a cloud revocation server (CRS) periodically. The CRS cannot forge a signature because it does not hold the complete signing key. To revoke users, the KGC simply notifies the cloud server to stop issuing new time update keys for them. With this technique, many existing IBS schemes can be improved to be revocable.
A. RELATED WORK
We discuss a few recently proposed IBS schemes below.
Shamir first introduced the idea of identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) [3] , after that Fiat and Shamir [4] presented a construction of IBS scheme based on the factoring problem. Since then, several other proposals based on factoring have been developed [5] - [7] .
The first fully practical implementation of identity-based setting emerged in 2001, when Boneh and Franklin [1] proposed an IBE scheme using Weil pairing on elliptic curves. Since then many solutions for IBS schemes with bilinear pairings have been proposed. Sakai et al. [8] presented an IBS scheme based on bilinear pairings but no security analysis was given. Choon and Cheon [9] proposed an IBS scheme by utilizing gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups. Paterson [10] presented another efficient IBS scheme and reduced the security of their scheme to a non-IBS scheme. Hess [11] , [12] developed an efficient IBS scheme and extended it to a generic framework, from which several variations can be exported (include ElGamal variations and Schnorr version).The author also considered the key escrow by extending the system to multiple trust authorities. Galindo and Garcia [13] also proposed a Schnorr-like lightweight IBS scheme without pairings. Bellare et al. [14] provided a framework for security proof of IBS schemes. Zhang et al. [15] proposed an efficient IBS scheme secure under the k-CAA assumption. Barreto et al. [16] presented an identity-based signcryption (IBSC) scheme with bilinear pairings. Based on Water's IBE scheme [17] , Paterson and Schuldt [18] presented an efficient IBS scheme and proved its security in the standard model. In recent years, many IBS schemes such as those based on ring signatures, blind signatures, proxy signatures, group signatures etc. were proposed [19] - [22] .
There are several efficient proposals of IBS schemes with or without bilinear pairings which have been proposed. However, only a few of them discussed the revocation of misbehaving users. Boneh and Franklin [1] developed a general approach to implement the revocation functionality in identity-based cryptosystems. That is, the KGC generates new secret keys for each non-revoked user periodically, and it simply stops to issue new private keys for the revoked users. Based on this idea, various revocable IBE schemes were proposed [23] - [27] in the past.
The first revocable IBS scheme was proposed by Tsai et al. [28] , which adopted the revocation technique employed in [27] . The authors proved the security of their scheme in the standard model. Based on their scheme, Hung et al. [29] proposed another RIBS scheme with improved security. Sun et al. [30] presented an efficient RIBS scheme without pairing but no security proof was given. Recently, Wei et al. [31] proposed a forward secure RIBS scheme employing the complete subtree (CS) method where the KGC must maintain a binary tree on which each node represents a user.
In the above RIBS schemes [28] - [31] , the KGC is responsible not only for issuing the initial identity key for each registered user, but also for renewing the time update keys for non-revoked users periodically, which brings two drawbacks. First, the KGC needs to be kept online which is not secure. Second, with the increasing in the number of system users, the computation and communication overheads at the KGC also increase quickly. In this case, the KGC will become the security and performance bottleneck of the whole cyrptosystem.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we propose the first RIBS scheme with a cloud revocation server. We describe the framework of a RIBS scheme with outsourced revocation and formalize the security model. Then we describe our proposed scheme in detail and analyze its security. We prove that our scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Neither a revoked user nor a curious cloud server can forge a valid signature even if they collude with other non-revoked users in the system. We also provide a performance evaluation of our scheme and we compare its performance with other IBS schemes.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present preliminary works in Section II. Section III describes the framework of a RIBS scheme with outsourced cloud revocation server and formalizes its security model. Section IV describes our proposed RIBS scheme in detail. We present the security analysis of our scheme in Section V. Section VI presents the performance evaluation results of our scheme. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY A. IDENTITY-BASED SIGNATURE
A typical IBS scheme involves three parties: the KGC, the signer and the verifier. There are four algorithms in an IBS scheme defined as follows.
• Setup: (MSK , PP) ← Setup(λ). KGC takes as input the security parameter λ, and outputs the master system key MSK and system public parameters PP including the system public key P pub .
• Initial Key Extraction: S ID ← KeyExt(MSK , ID). KGC generates a private key for each user. It takes as input MSK and a user's identity ID, and returns the private key S ID .
• Signing: σ ← Sign(m, S ID , PP). The signer takes as input his/her private key S ID , the message m and the public parameters, and outputs a signature σ .
• Verification: Accept/Reject ← Ver(σ, ID, m, PP). The verifier takes as input the signature σ , the identity ID of the signer, the message m and PP , and returns an ''Accept'' or a ''Reject'' to demonstrate if the signature is valid or not.
The consistency of an IBS scheme requires that for any S ID generated by algorithm KeyExt when given ID as input, and for any σ = Sign(m, S ID , PP), Ver(σ, ID, m, PP) = "Accept" holds.
B. BILINEAR PAIRINGS AND COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
Let G be an additive cyclic group, whose order is a large prime q. P is a generator of G. G T is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q. The mapê : G × G → G T is said to be an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies:
• Bilinearity: For all P, Q ∈ G, x, y ∈ Z * q , there iŝ e(xP, yQ) =ê(P, Q) xy ;
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G such that e(P, Q) = 1 G T ;
• Computability: For any element P, Q ∈ G, there is an polynomial time algorithm to computeê(P, Q) ∈ G T . Next we present the mathematical assumption used in our scheme.
Computational Diffie-Hellam Problem (CDH): Given a triple (P, aP, bP) for some unknown a, b ∈ Z * q , we compute abP.
The CDH assumption says that there is no polynomial time algorithm which can solve the CDH problem with nonnegligible probability.
III. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we describe the system framework of an outsourced RIBS scheme and its security model.
A. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
A RIBS scheme involves three parties: the KGC, the CRS and users (signers and verifiers). At the beginning of the system initialization, the KGC generates and publishes some common parameters and sends a secret master time key to the CRS. Then the KGC issues the initial identity key for each user with its master system key when the user is registered. The CRS issues and updates the users' time update keys according to the revocation user list received from the KGC. If a user is in the revocation user list, then the CRS refuses to update the time update key for the user. We present the framework of our system in Fig. 1 . Table 1 shows the notations used in the proposed RIBS scheme.
There are five algorithms in a RIBS scheme: system initialization algorithm (Setup), initial key extraction algorithm (InitKeyExt), time key updating algorithm (TimeKeyUpd), signing algorithm (Sign), verification algorithm (Ver). The KGC maintains a revocation list (RL) which contains the identities of revoked users and the RL is updated periodically.
• Setup(1 λ ) : The KGC takes a security parameter λ and outputs a master system key msk, a master time key mtk, a time period list T = (T 0 , T 1 , . . .) and system public parameters PP. KGC keeps msk for itself, and sends mtk to the CRS securely. PP is published to all users in the system. • InitKeyExt(PP, msk, ID) : On receiving a register request from the user with identity ID, the KGC runs this algorithm to issue a secret identity key D ID with the input PP, msk, a user's identity ID, and sends D ID to the user securely.
• TimeKeyUpd(PP, mtk, ID, T i ) : On receiving an update request from a user, the CRS first checks if the user is in the RL. If it is, the CRS rejects the update request.
If not, the CRS runs the algorithm and generates a new time key TK ID,T i for the user with the input PP, mtk, the user's identity ID and current time period T i .
A user's signing key S ID,T i consists of two parts: S ID,T i = (D ID , TK ID,T i ).
•
Sign(PP, m, ID, T i , S ID,T i ) :
To sign a message m, the signer runs this algorithm with input PP, m, his own identity ID, current time period T i and S ID,T i , and outputs the signature σ .
• 
B. SECURITY MODEL
Bellare et al. [14] first formalized the security of an IBS scheme in 2004, namely, security against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and identity attacks (EUF-CMA). Based on this formalization, we first consider the following two types of adversaries.
• Type I adversary A I . A I is a revoked user. Suppose A I has identity ID and was revoked at time period T i . A I intends to produce valid signatures after time period T i . A I still owns the initial identity key D ID , and we assume that A I can collude with other legal users to obtain their identity keys and time update keys at arbitrary time periods. A I cannot know is its own time update keys after time period T i .
• Type II adversary A II . Type II adversary can be seen as a curious CRS who tries to create a valid signature in the name of a system user. Since the CRS holds the master time key, so it can obtain the time update key of any user at any time. We also assume that A II can collude with other users to obtain their identity keys. In this case, the adversary cannot know the target user's identity key D ID . We define the security model of an outsourced RIBS scheme through the following two games between a challenger and one of the above two types of adversaries. The game between A I and a challenger S I is defined below.
Game 1:
• Setup. S I runs the Setup algorithm with input security parameter λ, and outputs msk, mtk and PP as defined in the system framework. S I keeps msk, mtk secret and sends PP to A I .
• Query. A I makes a series of queries to S I adaptively, and S I responds to each type of queries in the following way. 
From the above games we have the following security definition of a RIBS scheme.
Definition 1 (EUF-RID-CMA):
A RIBS scheme with outsourced revocation is said to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks if there is no probabilistic polynomial time adversary that has a nonnegligible advantage in either Game I or Game II .
IV. PROPOSED RIBS SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposed outsourced RIBS scheme. The scheme is composed of the following five algorithms, as defined in Section III-B.
• Setup(λ) : The KGC runs the algorithm as follows.
1) Choose two cyclic groups G and G 1 with the same prime order q. Let P be a generator of group G, and e : G × G → G 1 be a bilinear map. We compute g =ê(P, P). 2) We randomly choose two secret values s, t ∈ Z * q , where s is the master identity key and t is the maser time key. Then, we compute P pub = sP, P t = tP. Keep s secret and transform t to the CRS in a secure way. 3) We select three hash functions as follows:
4) We publish the system parameters
• InitKeyExt(PP, s, ID) : For a user with identity ID, the KGC sets
and sends the initial identity key D ID to the user through a secure channel.
• TimeKeyUpd(PP, t, ID, T i ) : Upon receiving an update request from a user ID at the time period T i , the CRS computes
and sends T ID,T i to the user.
• Sign(PP, m, ID, T i , D ID , T ID,T i ) : Given a message m and time period T i , a signer with identity ID produces the signature for m using the identity key D ID and time update key T ID,T i as follows. We randomly choose r ∈ Z * q , and compute:
The signature for the message m at the time period T i is σ = (U , α).
• Ver(PP, m, σ, ID, T i ) : On receiving a signature σ = (U , α) on message m and time period T i , the verifier computes
and verifies if
holds. The verifier outputs "Accept" if it does, or "Reject" if not. We demonstrate the consistency of the scheme as follows:
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme in terms of the security model defined in section III-B. We employ the forking lemma technique introduced in [32] . Lemma 1: If there is a type I adversary who makes at most q H 1 , q H 2 , q h , , q e , q u , q s queries to the hash functions H 1 , H 2 , h, initial key extract oracle, time key update oracle and signing oracle respectively and breaks the proposed RIBS scheme with non-negligible probability I , then there exists a probabilistic challenger who can solve the CDH problem with advantage
Proof: Suppose A I is a type I adversary who wins the attack game with advantage I . We construct an algorithm S I who uses A I as a subroutine to solve the CDH problem.
Suppose S I is given a CDH instance (P, P a = aP, P b = bP), where P is a generator of an additive cyclic group G of order q, and a, b is unknown to S I . To compute P ab = abP, S I simulates a challenger for the adversary as follows.
• Setup. S I randomly chooses s ∈ Z * q and sets P pub = sP, P t = P a and sends (P, P pub , P t ) to the adversary A I . S I chooses an l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q H 2 } and maintains three lists L 1 , L 2 and L 3 which are initially empty. S I answers A I 's queries as follows.
• Query.
-Hash query. We assume that A I has already queried the corresponding hash oracles before it makes further queries. S I answers three kinds of hash queries as follows. 
S I searches the list L 3 , if there is an entry (m, α, h(m, α)) and h(m, α) = v, then S I aborts, else S I returns the signature σ = (U , α) to A I . In this case, σ is a valid signature.
• Forgery. Finally, the adversary A I outputs a signature σ * = (U * , α * ) on ID , T , and message m * .
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If (ID , T ) = (ID * , T * ) and Ver(PP, m * , ID * , T * ) = "Accept", then output σ * = (U * , α * ). Otherwise, the output "fail" is issued. Now we apply the forking lemma technique. S I runs the above simulated game again with the same random coins, but responds to hash queries issued by A I with different random values. By the General Forking Lemma, A I will output a different forgery σ = (U , α ) on the same message m * , identity ID * and time period T * with nonnegligible probability (the probability would be 1/9 for some appropriate chosen parameters. A more in-depth description is given in [32] . Here we assume that A I always outputs another valid forgery without loss of generality). Since S I runs the game with the same random tape, we have α * = α = g r from some r ∈ Z * q , while the underlying hash values corresponding to the two forged signatures are different. We assume that in the signature (U * , α * ),
While in the signature (U , α ),
Since the hash values are randomly chosen, so x * = x , y * = y and v * = v with high probability. On the other hand, since both (U * , α * ) and (U , α ) are valid signatures, we havê
By dividing the above two equations, and the condition α * = α , we havê e(U * − U , P) =ê(P pub , P)
From the above equation we obtain:
So we get the solution of the challenging CDH instance. Now we analyze the probability that S I succeeds. In the Setup and Query phase, the simulation is perfect except the following two events happen. First, S I issues a query (ID * , T * ) to H 2 oracle, which has a probability of q H 2 /q. Second, S I returns a signature (U , α) on (m, ID i , T j ) and h(m, α) has already been in the list L 3 and h(m, α) = v, where v is randomly chosen by S I . This event occurs with a probability of q h /q. If the simulation process is executed smoothly, then in the Forgery phase, A I will output a valid forgery (ID , T , m * , σ * ) with an advantage of I . Note that since H 2 is a random oracle, the probability that (ID , T , m * , σ * ) is valid without any query of H 2 (ID , T ) is 1/q. So (ID , T ) has been asked to H 2 oracle in the Query Phase with a probability of 1 − 1 q . Moreover, l is randomly chosen from {1, 2, . . . , q H 2 }. Thus (ID , T ) = (ID * , T * ) holds with a probability of (1
. So the probability that
From the above analysis we can see that S I solves the CDH problem with probability (1 − 
Proof: Suppose A II is a type II adversary who wins the attack game with advantage II . We construct an algorithm S II , who uses A II as a subroutine to solve the CDH problem. Suppose S II is given a CDH instance (P, P a = aP, P b = bP), where P is a generator of an additive cyclic group G of order q, and a, b is unknown to S II . To compute P ab = abP, S II simulates a challenger for the adversary as follows.
• Setup. S II randomly choose t ∈ Z * q , and sets P pub = P a , P t = tP and sends (P, P pub , P t ) to the adversary A II . S II then randomly chooses l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q H 1 }. S II maintains three lists L 1 , L 2 and L 3 which are initially empty, and answers A II 's queries as follows.
-Hash query. We assume that the adversary has already queried the corresponding hash oracles before it makes further queries. * H 1 -query. On receiving the i-th H 1 -query on identity ID i , S II first checks if there is an entry in the list L 1 . If there is, S II returns the entry, else S II randomly chooses x ∈ Z * q and sets 
(ID, T i ).
S II then randomly chooses U ∈ G, v ∈ Z * q and computes
S II searches the list L 3 , if there is an entry (m, α, h(m, α)) and h(m, α) = v, then S II aborts, else S II returns the signature σ = (U , α) to A II . In this case, σ is a valid signature.
• Forgery. The adversary A II outputs a forgery σ * = (U * , α * ) on identity ID , time period T , and message m * . If ID = ID * and Ver(PP, m * , ID , T ) = accept, S II outputs (U * , α * ) as the forgery else it outputs ''fail.'' S II runs the simulated game twice with the same random coins, but responds the hash queries with different random values. By the General Forking Lemma, A II will output a different forgery σ = (U , α ) on the same identity ID * , message m * and time period T * i with non-negligible probability. We have α * = α = g r , and assume that in the signature (U * , α * ),
Since the hash values are randomly chosen, so x * = x , y * = y and v * = v with overwhelming probability. On the other hand, since both (U * , α * ) and (U , α ) are valid signatures, we havê
By dividing the above two equations, and the condition α * = α , we havê e(U * − U , P) =ê(P pub , P b ) then e(P, P ab )
From the above equation we can see that
The analysis of S II 's advantage is just the same as S I 's advantage in the simulated Game I. We note that at the end of simulated Game II, A II will output a valid signature on identity ID * with a probability of (1
q , which is exactly the advantage that S II succeeds. This concludes the proof.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The proposed RIBS scheme with outsourced revocation is existence unforgeable against adaptive chosen identity and message attack under the CDH assumption.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme, including computation and communication costs. We choose the Ate pairingê : G × G → G T generated by a point on a super singular eppliptic curve VOLUME 5, 2017 over a finite field E (F p ) , where G, G T are groups of prime order q. To ensure an appropriate security level, p and q are large prime numbers with a length of 512 and 160 bits respectively. Table 2 lists the notations used to describe the computation costs of the operations used in the related schemes.
Previous implementations have showed that compared with the computation costs of time-consuming bilinear pairing map, map-to-point hash, scalar multiplication and modular exponentiation operations, the computation costs of point addition, multiplication in G T and the ordinary hash operations are trivial. Therefore, we only consider TGˆe, TG H , TG m , T e when we evaluate the performance.
We evaluate the costs of the above basic operations using MIRACL library [33] on the elastic compute service (ECS) host provided by the Alibaba Cloud platform. The operating system of the host is Ubutu 14.04 for 64 bit with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 0 @ 2.30GHz, and equipped with 1GB RAM. Table 3 lists the computational time for related operations on the host.
Since there is no other RIBS scheme with CRS based on pairings and proven secure in the random oracle model, we therefore compared the performance of our scheme with some IBS schemes with bilinear pairings but without revocation functionality, and we also compared the performance of our scheme with two RIBS schemes that are secure in the standard model. Table 4 lists the comparisons among the schemes of Hess [12] , Paterson [10] , Tsai et al. [28] , Hung et al. [29] and ours in terms of computation costs for the initial key extraction, time key update, signing and verification.
There is no revocation in Hess's and Paterson's schemes, but we can extend their schemes to be revocable by using the framework we proposed in section III-A. Tsai and Hung have included revocation functionality in their schemes, but the schemes are designed in the standard model, which means that the hash functions they used are much more inefficient than those used in the random oracle model. In the comparisons, although we omit most of the computation costs of specific, hash operations, the comparison results are still meaningful and referential. We also take into account the operations which can be precomputed in all the schemes to achieve the best performance from them.
For the computation cost in the initial key extraction, Hess's scheme requires TG m + TG H (7.071ms), same as Paterson's and our scheme. Tsai's and Hung's schemes both require 3TG m (5.91ms). As for the time key update, our scheme requires TG m + TG H (7.071ms). Tsai's and Hung's schemes require 3TG m (5.91ms). There is no such operations in Hess's and Paterson's scheme, but if we extend their schemes using the technique we propose, the computation costs of time key update of their schemes will be same as ours, namely, TG m + TG H (7.071). As for the signing process, Hess's scheme requires TGˆe + 2TG m + T e (9.546ms). Paterson's scheme requires 3TG m (5.91ms). Tsai's scheme requires 4TG m (7.88ms). Hung's scheme requires 5TG m (9.85ms) while our scheme only requires 2TG m (3.94ms). For the verification process, although there are three bilinear maps that need to be evaluated for each signature in our scheme, but some of them can be precomputed. Hess's scheme requires 2TGˆe + T e (10.881ms). Paterson'sS scheme requires 2TGˆe + 2T e (11.212ms). Tsai's scheme requires 4TGˆe(21.1ms). Hung's scheme requires 4TGˆe + T e (21.431ms). Our scheme requires TGˆe + 2T e (5.937ms). Although our scheme seems a little more time consuming than Tsai's and Hung's schemes in the initial key extraction and time key update process, it is worth pointing out that there are several point addition brevity. Moreover, the initial key extraction and time key update process would not be executed frequently, so there is impact on the overall performance. As for the signing and verification process, our scheme outperforms the other schemes. Table 5 presents the comparisons of communication costs in terms of the size of initial identity key, time update key and signature. Let |G| denote the size of each element in group G. If G is a elliptic curve on finite field F p , where p is a 512 bit prime number, then |G| denotes the size of a point in G, which is 1024 bits. |q| denotes the bit length of q, which is, for example, 160 bits to achieve an appropriate security level. The initial identity key has a length of |G| The time update key has the same length as the initial identity key in each scheme except for Hess's and Paterson's schemes. For the size of the signature, Hess's scheme has a length of |G|+|q| (1184 bits), which is same as ours. Paterson's scheme has a length of 2|G| (2048 bits). Both Tsai's and Hung's schemes has a length of 4|G| (4096 bits). We observe that the communication costs of Hess's scheme and ours are lower than the other schemes. We also present the security model and revocability of the target schemes in table 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient RIBS scheme with CRS based on bilinear pairings. To eliminate the computation and communication costs of the KGC, revocation functionality is outsourced to a cloud revocation server. We present the framework of the outsourced revocation RIBS scheme and formalize the security model. Our scheme is proven to be secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen messages and identity attacks in the random oracle model. The performance comparisons show that our scheme has lower computation costs and shorter signature size than previously proposed RIBS schemes thereby demonstrating its suitability for resource-constrained resources such as wireless sensor networks. 
